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Abstract. Delegation of tasks is a basic pattern of numerous interactions within
multiagent systems. Since agents are selfish and exploit local knowledge about
their actions as well as the environment, delegators face the hazard of losing
outcome due to self-serving behavior of the “employed” agent. This research
work adopts the economic theory of agency to study delegation relationships in
multiagent systems and to design a mechanism for task delegation that prevents
delegators from losing outcomes in such relationships. The contribution of this
work is a mechanism for task delegation considering the economic situation of
agents. The paper proposes the results of a simulation study to demonstrate the
usefulness and efficacy of the provided artifact.
Keywords: Agency Theory, Multiagent System, Task Delegation

1

Introduction

Raising the flexibility of production lines, logistics networks, and whole business
ecosystems is one of the core objectives in the field of Industry 4.0. Shifting tasks
from centralized units to local entities is a very promising and important change of
paradigms in today’s industries. With multiagent systems (MAS), the computer science contributes a useful and in parts already adopted, basic technology to delegate
tasks in Industry 4.0 scenarios, e.g. within self-organizing Smart Factories.
Delegation of tasks is a pervasive phenomenon and a major issue in MAS. This
importance is reflected by the majority of the definitions of the term “agent” that
make explicit references to task delegation [1] and the seminal contract net protocol
introduced as a basic mechanism for task delegation into the MAS-community since
the early literature [2]. This paper use the term “manager” for the delegating and
“contractor” for the adopting software agent. Recent years in MAS research have
witnessed interest in mechanisms to decide whether to delegate a task or not and, if
yes, to whom a task should be delegated at best. While the first question is answered
by different “make-or-buy” decision models, the latter includes the question if the
contractor is trustworthy. Solutions to this problem are mutual models of trust, the
software agents build up and keep updated (e.g. by learning). Using such models, the
manager tries to determine the likelihood that the delegation will fail [3]. Other approaches rely on policies [4] or organizational rules [5]. In light of this fast growing
literature, it is important to understand and to mitigate problems in delegation rela12th International Conference on Wirtschaftsinformatik,
March 4-6 2015, Osnabrück, Germany
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tionships mainly caused by self-interested contractors [1]. Consider a situation in
which a manager cannot monitor the contractors’ actions. Outcomes are not only influenced by the actions but also by an unpredictable external disturbance that is not
verifiably by the manager. The only verifiable signal is the outcome at the end of the
relationship. In such situations contractors will minimize their effort because they
cannot be monitored and they can excuse low outcomes with disturbances that are
beyond their control – even if this is a cheating behavior. Managers cannot infer from
outcomes that a contractor’s effort was low or high and thus cannot blame contractors
for low effort. Subsequently, managers face the hazard of losing outcome.
Economic agency theory (EAT) deals with such situations of task delegation since
the early 1970ies and provide formal frameworks and feasible means for analyzing
and solving a broad class of problems in delegation relationships for the manager (in
terms of agency theory: the principal) [6]. Up until recently, the findings of EAT are
not reflected appropriate by the MAS community like this was done with game and
decision theory. The present paper at hand sheds more light on the conflicts of interest
as well as incentive problems and provides a mechanism for incentive compatible task
delegation in MAS. In a task delegation relationship, one software agent (manager)
hands over a task to another software agent (contractor). The manager‘s outcomes are
directly related to the actions of the contractors. To perform an action, the contractor
has to spend effort. Outcomes are not only affected by the contractors’ actions but
also by external disturbances not verifiable by the manager. Manager and contractor
are able to verify the outcome at the end of the relationship at zero costs in an undisputed way. Agents are self-interested and maximize their own objective function.
It is further assumed that managers cannot monitor the contractors’ actions – all actions are hidden from the manager. Therefore, the problem of “hidden actions” [7] is
addressed. EAT suggests introducing incentive mechanisms into task delegation [6].
To reduce hazards in multiagent task delegation, the paper adopts this suggestion and
develops an incentive compatible task delegation mechanism. The mechanism is
evaluated by a simulation study that shows evidence for the method’s efficacy. The
leading research question in this paper is how such a mechanism has to be designed
in order to maximize the manager’s outcomes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the theoretical
background is described and approaches in the extant literature are analyzed. In section 3, the research method is introduced. Section 4 outlines the formal framework
and proposes a novel task delegation mechanism. In section 5, the experimental setup
and the results of the simulation study are provided. Section 6 concludes the paper.

2

Theoretical Background

2.1

Economic Agency Theory

Agency theory has its roots in information economics and deals with delegation relationships characterized by an asymmetric distribution of information about contractor’s characteristics, contractor’s actions or states of the world [6]. Depending on the
type of information asymmetry, the manager faces corresponding problems like hid-
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den characteristics, hidden action and hidden information – all followed by a loss of
outcome for the manager. The paper focuses on hidden action as a class of problems
where the manager cannot observe the contractors’ actions without additional (and
therefore costly) means. It is assumed that contractors are self-interested and maximize their own objective function. External disturbances exist as a random component
that can’t be observed by the managers [6]. This situation is summarized in figure 1
based on seminal papers published in journals rated with A+ or A in the JQ 2-ranking.
External disturbance
for contractor
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Fig. 1. Agency relationship with hidden action

Economic literature provides numerous variations and advancements of this standard
two side, one stage, one period, one contract model with only one signal (outcome).
To give an overview of advanced agency models, relevant economic outlets were
searched by appropriate terms (e.g. common agency) to retrieve recent papers published after 2000. Additionally, fundamental papers in agency theory, like [7], were
included in the search space. During decades, economists built up a comprehensive
knowledge base of delegation patterns exploitable for MAS researchers. So common
agency models deal with additional problems evolving from multiple managers delegating tasks to the same contractor [9]. So managers compete with each other for the
contractor’s resources and had to take into account, that other managers’ offers influence the effectiveness of their own offer. In settings with only one manager but more
than one contractor (team of contractors), the manager faces the supplementary problems of free riding and production externalities [10]. A combination of both is
reached in models with multiple managers and multiple contractors [11]. If the agency
relationship is multi-staged, the contractor on one stage is the manager for another
contractor on the subsequent stage at the same time. In this environment, the problem
of federation is added to the agency relationship [12]. Contractors on subsequent stages are able to federate to the detriment of the manager on the very first stage.
If agency relationships repeat (in a finite or infinite time horizon) all parties are
able to learn from previous periods and will adapt their behaviors. This makes it necessary to consider history-dependent preferences for effort spending [13]. In settings
in which the manager allocates more than one contract to a contractor at the same
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Fig. 2. Cause-effect model for the effectiveness of incentive schemes

time the manager must be aware of the mutual influences between these contracts. If
one contract commits the contractor to produce a certain result while another asks for
maintenance work, contractors will neglect maintenance if they are paid according to
their production outcome [14]. While the contractor in the standard model produces
only one verifiable signal (the outcome) multi-signal models assume that there are
additional signals that allows managers for evaluating contractors’ actions. But this
raise questions about weighting or inconsistency of different signals [15].
Up until recently, economists also developed a bunch of means for solving agency
problems in different settings and to effectively mitigate hazards for managers. Beside
means for allowing to monitor contractors’ actions and for unveiling information
about external disturbances [15], economists mainly developed methods to incentivize
contractors to behave congruent to the managers objectives [16]. Since incentives
were identified as the most promising tool to overcome agency problems [17], this
work is grounded on this knowledge and introduces incentives schemes in multiagent
task delegation mechanisms. Incentives schemes affect the contractor’s objective
function so that it gets congruent with the objective function of the manager. This is
done by a conditioned payment of the contractor depending on the produced outcome.
Graphically, this lead to a new directed edge in figure 1 that connects “outcome of
contactor” with “payment”. A higher outcome induces higher payments. As simple it
sounds in the first view the more complex it gets on the operational level of designing
the incentive scheme [18]: Who should receive the payment – especially in teams of
contractors where outcome cannot be assigned to a specific contractor (team production)? When should the incentive be paid – immediately or in future to avoid shortsightedness of the contractor? Should the incentive payment only be based on the
actual outcome or is there a need for including past outcomes – especially in scenarios
with highly varying outcomes contractors demand for smoothing? What is the best
smoothening filter? Do contractors accept the contract if all risk is shifted to them or
is it effective to divide payment into a fix and a variable part? What is an appropriate
amount for incentive payments and an appropriate gradient of the incentive function?
Following primarily results from economic research the effectiveness of incentive
schemes mainly depends on seven factors [18]. Figure 2 give a brief résumé about
incentive literature and provide a cause-effect model for explaining influences on the
effectiveness of incentive schemes.

1682

2.2

Task Delegation in Multiagent Systems

Task delegation was one of the major concerns in multiagent research over the past
decades. At an early stage, Bond and Gasser identified task allocation as one of the
basic problems in distributed artificial intelligence (DAI) and outlined that the avoidance of uncertainty in results or completion is one of the bases for making allocation
decisions [19]. With the contract net protocol a seminal pattern for task delegation
was introduced into MAS research from the very beginning [2]. Research is mainly
focused on the question to which agent a task should be delegated at best. Recent
studies proposed a permanently increasing number of market mechanism including
auction or negotiation protocols. However, as the principal concern these works suggest solutions for ex ante problems of delegation (selecting the best contractor) – ex
post problems arising from the possibility of hidden actions are not in the scope of
these approaches and are still an understudied field of research in the main outlets of
the community like the AAMAS Journal and Proceedings.
Reflecting the importance of task delegation, Castelfranchi and Falcone suggested
a theory of delegation for MAS from a plan-based view on the problem [1]. Although
the authors analyzed possible conflicts between manager and contractor caused by a
selfish exploitation of asymmetric distributed knowledge, they studiously avoided the
whole body of knowledge in EAT dealing with that problem. This is even more surprising since Kraus made this theory accessible for DAI researcher two years earlier
in a very comprehensive study [20]. Kraus figured out that in cases where one agent
delegates tasks to selfish agents and the delegating agent faces a lack of information
about the other agent(s), EAT provides a purposeful framework for task delegation
problems in MAS based on incentive mechanisms.
Up to recently several studies are concerned with incentive contracting in MAS.
From the viewpoint of mechanism design Shoham and Tanaka investigated the effect
of incentives in a public goods game played by rational software agents. The authors
show that an incentive mechanism can be established so that agents are willing to
contribute to the provision of public goods although this is not individually rational
without such an mechanism [21]. As the society in its whole is the delegator, a public
goods game is not the standard case of task delegation. Cruz and Simaan studied a
more characteristic delegation relationship between a team leader and the members of
the team within a MAS. By introducing incentives in a standard leader-follower
Stackelberg game, an equilibrium was implemented so that the strategies of the team
members were in align with the global objectives of the team leader [22].
Dynamic scheduling of production is an often addressed problem by MAS researchers because inherent advantages of MAS tend to fit to the challenges of this
application domain. After a task is delegated by a scheduling agent (manager) to a
specific machine agent (contractor), the task might be late due to malicious behavior
of the machine agent. Avoiding this hazard, Váncza and Márkus proposed an incentive mechanism for production scheduling based on in-process tardiness penalty [23].
By conducting simulation studies, the authors provide evidence that their penalty
mechanism effectively solves the problem of not fulfilling commitments towards the
customers due to delays caused by machine agents. Although Váncza and Márkus
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employs several machine agents, it is not a model with multiple contractors in the
sense of EAT since the machine agents are not related to each other and there are no
additional problems that arise from multiple contractors.
Recent studies concerning multiagent task delegation more and more rely on the
concepts similar with trust, reputation or compliance in social science. Braynov and
Sandholm show that in electronic commerce where agents act as buyers and sellers,
social welfare, the amount of trade, and the objective functions of agents can be maximized if seller’s trust is equal to the trustworthiness of the buyer [24]. To achieve this
equality, the authors define an incentive compatible bilateral contract in which agents
truthfully report about their trustworthiness. Without being mentioned by the authors,
this work strongly relates to the adverse selection problem in markets well known in
economic literature and first reported by [25] in 1970. A slightly different approach is
provided by Jurca and Faltings as they incentivize rational agent in open, distributed
marketplaces to truthfully report about their reputation [26]. The simulation experiments show that defective behavior decreases about approx. 40% when agents are
provided with incentives. Hermoso and Cardoso use learning concepts in incentive
mechanism for the first time [27]. They show that over time an almost optimal incentive scheme evolves and contractors select the most reliable action. Hermoso and
Cardoso do not consider additional problems that arise from the existence of multiple
contractors. Thus, it is not a multiple contractor model in the sense of agency theory.
To sum up MAS literature, table 1 shows a classification of the research conducted
by the MAS community in terms of agency theory. Therefore, the number of managers and contractors will be examined as well as the assignment of these roles to specific software agents. All works only consider models consisting of a single stage, one
contract and one signal. They only differ in the number of participants and periods.
Table 1. Classification of task delegation relationships in MAS research
Paper

Participants

Manager

Contractor

Periods

[1]

1:1

delegator

adopter

1

[21]

1: many

“the society”

society member

1

[22]

1:many

team leader

team member

many

[23]

1:1

scheduler

machine

many

[24]

1:1

buyer

seller

1

[26]

1:1

buyer

seller

1

[27]

1:many

service requester

service provider

many

This paper is closely related to the developments in the field of incentive based task
delegation in MAS literature as presented above and is also based on the body of
knowledge of the EAT. The comprehensive work of [20] is an essential precursor.
However, the proposed approaches of incentive based MAS research draws several
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concerns as they mainly consider 1:1-delegation relationships in a single period in
time. Approaches considering a 1:many-relationship with more than one period can
be found in [22, 27]. In [22] a standard leader-follower Stackelberg game was used to
analyze the problem and to design a mechanism for solving it. But the model is missing stochastic to describe random external disturbances as a crucial element in delegation relationships. The same stands for [23]. The provided approach in this paper differs from existing research as it considers a 1:many-relationship lasting over more
than one period and explicitly model stochastic influences during task completion.

3

Research Method

The research is conducted by applying the design science methodology [8] to ensure
rigor in design and evaluation. In design, it is ensured by grounding the artifact on
proven cause-effect-models and feasible means from the agency theory. Design is
furthermore led by well-established methods from system engineering and uses constructs as well as mathematical notations out of the agency theory. To obtain
knowledge about the usefulness of the artifact in the appropriate environment scientifically, a simulation study is conducted to evaluate the task delegation mechanism.
The proposed artifact is applied to a MAS operating the on-site logistics of a road
construction site during the earth works phase. Considering this, the experiment design consists of two models. The first represents the logistics system of the construction site with its processes and physical conditions while the second model contains
the MAS including the task delegation mechanism. The parameterization of the logistics system model was done by using existing empirical data from real world construction sites regarding loading times, driving times etc. [28]. The calibration of the
construction site logistics model was done by a specific scenario built up by domain
experts to ensure rigor [29]. The model matches the values calculated in this scenario.

4

Incentive Compatible Task Delegation Mechanism

4.1

An Agency Model of Task Delegation in MAS

A contractor
receives a task from the manager . In order to fulfill the task, the
contractor performs an action
at a specific time
. Thus, denotes the
set of all possible actions of all contractors. Let
be the contractor’s effort to perform
the
action
at
time
described
as
a
bijective
function
. The possibility of negative efforts is excluded.
The payment of the manager to a contractor at a specific time is denoted
as
and therefore negative payments (penalties) are excluded, too. Contractors possess an objective function that is partially differentiable, separable and strictly
monotone.
(1)
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(2)
(3)
The assumption is that the first derivation with respect to the payment is positive
(
) and the first derivation w.r.t. the effort is negative (
). This
means that the payment is judged as positive while the effort is judged as negative. If
the second derivation w.r.t. the payment is positive (negative), the contractor is willing to take risks (is risk-averse). If the second derivation w.r.t. the effort is positive
(negative), the contractor is eager to work (is work-averse). If the second derivations
are equal to zero, the contractor is risk- neutral resp. work- neutral. The
script denotes different values of the objective function but not different function
rules. This reflects time consistency of preferences as it is assumed in EAT.
While performing the actions and by spending effort, the contractor produces an
outcome
. Negative outcomes are excluded from the model. Outcomes are
not only influenced by the actions but also by a stochastic external disturbance modeled by a conditional density and distribution function (“production function” ).
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
The monotone likelihood ratio property is valid: Let

be different effort

levels resulting from different actions a contractors carries out. It holds that
so it can be derived that
what leads to a first order stochastic dominance. It is further assumed
that there exist only strictly positive possibilities:
This ensures that every outcome is reachable at every effort level and the manager
cannot infer from outcomes that a specific effort level was chosen by the contractor.
This, contractors choose their actions by maximizing the objective function:
(8)
If payment
is fixed, the contractor is only able to reduce effort by choosing the
appropriate action in order to maximize the objective function. Because of the monotone likelihood ratio property this will raise the probability of a lower outcome. Let
(9)
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be the overall outcome for the manager received from all

relationships and let
(10)

denote the overall payment to all contractors of the manager. Then the manager’s
objective function can be denoted as
(11)
(12)
(13)
If it is assumed that the manager is risk-averse, then
and
holds. Again, the subscript describes different values of the
manager’s objective function at different times and not different function rules what
implies the common assumption of time-stable preferences. The manager’s maximization problem is formulated by
. Since
is beyond the manager’s sphere of influence, the only possibility is to vary
by adjusting the payment
rules. As incentive compatible payments were chosen as the solution for the hidden
action problem in task delegation, the design of these payment rules is the core of the
presented approach and will be described in the subsequent section.
4.2

A Novell Incentive Compatible Task Delegation Mechanism for MAS

Let a payment rule be denoted as a mathematical function that maps a set of payment
function parameter
and the smoothed assessment basis
for the incentive payment onto a real number greater or equal zero. Thus,
can be reformulated
as
with
. Seven factors
influencing the efficacy of an incentive scheme can be derived from economic theory
(see figure 2). Therefore, the set consists of seven elements as shown in table 2.
Since outcome is produced by a team of contractors, it is assumed that the manager
receives an additional signal that allows for identifying the contribution of a single
contractor to the overall outcome. Therefore, a contractor’s smoothed output
is the
assessment basis for the incentive payment to this contractor.
Table 2. Parameter of the payment function
Parameter

Description

Ratio of fixed payment
Amount of fixed payment
Value of smoothing factor
Weight of actual outcome
Amount of variable payment per unit of outcome
Gradient of the incentive function
Height of the hurdle rate
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Domain

Regarding to the suggestions of EAT, the newly provided payment function contains
a fixed and a variable part and the assessment basis is exponentially smoothed. The
variable part will only be paid if the assessment basis exceeds a certain hurdle rate.
Bringing all together, the payment scheme is defined as
(14)
(15)

4.3

Incentive Compatibility and Participation Constraint

By relating the payment of the contractor to the outcome the contractor’s decision
problem is expanded to a decision problem with an expected value of the objective
function and needs to be reformulated as
(16)
This decision problem is denoted as incentive compatible within the EAT [30].
Considering a reservation value
the contractor holds with or without taking
part in the delegation relationship, the contractor will participate if
(17)
4.4

Technical specification

The technical specification is informed by the FIPA Contract Net Interaction Protocol
Specification (FCNIP) [31]. As shown in figure 3 on the next page the FCNIP is extended by three more internal steps and one more interaction to match the requirements of the proposed incentive compatible task delegation mechanism.
The call for proposal (cfp) contains a description of the task that needs to be fulfilled and in addition the payment rule according to formula (15). By calculating the
participation constraint (formula (17)) the contractor decides whether to refuse the
call or to submit a proposal in order to adopt the task. This is slightly different to the
FCNIP in which the cfp contains the question about the amount of compensation the
manager must provide so that the contractor adopts the task – but this is due to the
different perspectives. While the FCNIP focuses on finding the best (e.g. cheapest)
contractor, the artifact at hand focus on the ex post-problem of proposing an incentive
compatible task delegation to an already identified contractor. Thus, if a proposal is
submitted the contractor accepts the payment rule and the manager do not have any
reason for rejecting the proposal. However, this possibility still remains in the specification to allow reconsiderations. After accepting the proposal the task is delegated to
the contractor. For performing the task, the contractor chose the action according to
the decision problem formulated in (16). Then the contractor performs the action,
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Manager

Contractor
call for proposal
refuse
propose
reject-proposal
accept-proposal
choose action
inform-result: inform

perform action

calculate payment
send payment

Fig. 3. Technical specification
realizes the external disturbances and produces the outcome. Subsequently, the manager is informed about the amount of outcome. The manager now calculates the payment according to the outcome and sends the payment to the contractor.

5

Evaluation

5.1

Experimental Setup

To provide evidence for the purposefulness of the artifact it was applied in a simulated environment in which the MAS operates the on-site logistics of a road construction
site during the earth works phase. The MAS consists of a dispatcher agent (the manager) that delegates transportation tasks to truck agents (the contractors) that produce
outcomes by driving to different loading and unloading places on their own decisions
in accordance to times for driving, loading, unloading, and waiting and excavators’
loading performances. The causal chain between increasing the outcome by increasing payments is explained by formulas (3), (7), and (16). The physical model of the
site contains a transportation road network modeled as a graph and waiting queues at
loading and unloading places. Variations in loading and unloading performances were
modeled as beta distributions based on empirical evidences. The implementation was
validated against a specific scenario build up by domain experts and it was tested by
code walkthroughs performed by two mutually independent PhD students.
Table 3 shows the simulation plan. The amount of fixed payment ( ) is in the interval of
€/minute. That reflects common rental prices for trucks including
drivers in Germany. At its maximum the smoothing factor is 480. Since each tick
simulates one real time minute, the outcomes of the whole day (8h*60m) are incorporated at maximum. The gradient of the incentive function is between 0.1 and 2.0 and
is therefore exponential or linear. The interval of the hurdle rate is determined by the
performances of the machines that were chosen for the simulation.
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Table 3. Simulation plan
Characteristic

Explanandum

Description

Amount of soil being transported (outcome for manager)

Explanantia
Interval

see table 2;
;

Step

;

;

;

;

;

; 1,000 combinations randomly chosen

Duration

480 ticks per run

Runs

100 runs (allows evidence at a level of significance of 0.9999 and
a random error of 0.01)

5.2

Results

The simulation experiment was conducted with and without the proposed artifact.
Figure 4 and table 4 gives a descriptive overview of the results – numbers in braces
describe the baseline case without the artifact. As one can see, using the task delegation mechanism lead to an increase of the outcome of the manager. Analyzing the
influences of the parameter of the payment function on the outcome, a multiple correlation analysis shows a correlation of 0.4018 what provides evidence for a medium
joint influence of all parameter in their combination.
[m³]

Table 4. Measures of dispersion and central tendency

Statistic
Arithmetic mean

Value
774.7309 (653.5603)

Quartile

Fig. 4. Box plot diagrams

0.25

764.6733 (642.4145)

0.50

782.1081 (653.3393)

0.75

792.6711 (664.8586)

Variance

690.1779 (238.2371)

Var. Coeff.

0.0339

(0.0235)

The negative spikes in Fig. 4 are caused by the stochastic effects in the physical model of the site as they occur in reality, too. To analyze the influence of a single parameter on the outcome, the correlation coefficients were analyzed pair wise in table 5.
Table 5. Correlations
Correlation of

with outcome

-0.039

-0.045

0.157
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0.015

0.032

-0.039

-0.307

As table 5 shows, the ratio of fixed payment ( ) as well as the amount of fixed
payment ( ) are negatively correlated with the outcome. This also stands for the
gradient of the incentive function ( ) and the hurdle rate ( ). The value of the
smoothening factor ( ), the weight of the actual outcome ( ) and the amount of
variable payment ( ) are positively correlated with the outcome.
5.3

Discussion

Introducing the provided incentive based task delegation mechanism into the simulated multiagent system lead to an increase of the average outcomes for the manager. As
the boxplot diagram in figure 4 demonstrates, the use of the artifact also leads to
negative spikes – but the lowest value in the experiment using the artifact was higher
than the average value of outcomes in the experiment without the artifact. Results also
show that the variance of the outcomes as well as the coefficient of variance is increasing. This means that managers will receive higher outcomes on the one hand but
also face a higher volatility on the other hand. Since risk neutrality of managers was
assumed, the only criterion is the maximization of the outcome.
The multiple correlation of 0.4018 provides evidence for a positive but medium
joint influence of all design parameter of the mechanism. Furthermore, the simulation
experiment only leads to weak or very weak correlations of the design parameter.
This is due to the characteristics of the chosen experimental setting. Earth works suffers from a high influence of stochastic processes on the outcomes. As the simulation
was grounded on empirical evidences from real world construction sites, the high
impact of random components was transferred into the experiment. So, results show a
positive effect of the artifact but stochastic influences still plays an important role.
Regarding the question about how a task delegation mechanism in multiagent systems has to be designed in order to maximize the manager’s outcomes, the correlations of the design parameter with the outcome provide advices for system engineering. First, if a fixed payment is offered, the amount should be low – raising the
amount of variable payment will lead to higher outcomes. But results indicate that a
completely variable payment is not efficient at all. The first 100 results with the highest outcome were achieved at an average ratio of fixed payment of 0.496. Thus a halfand-half payment is advisable. Hurdle rates are means to challenge contractors to
raise effort in order to exceed the hurdle. But the higher the hurdle, the more exhausting it gets. If hurdles are only achievable at a prohibitively high effort, contractors
will not provide any additional effort. Thus, hurdles have to be kept low. The first 100
results with the highest outcome advice to set the hurdle rates at about 33% of the
outcome that can be achieved at maximum effort.

6

Conclusion

This paper presents an incentive based task delegation mechanism grounded on the
EAT which is by so far understudied in the field of multiagent systems research.
There are two main results of this work. First, the results of the simulation provide
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evidence for the feasibility and efficacy of the provided artifact in order to maximize
outcomes for task delegating agents by aligning the objective functions of managers
and contractors. Second, the conducted simulation experiment provides advices for
multiagent system engineers for designing incentive compatible task delegation
mechanisms. Results indicate that contractors should be paid fixed and variable with a
ratio of about fifty-fifty. Hurdle rates are efficient at about 33% of the outcome that
can be achieved at maximum effort. The amount of fixed payment is less important
than the amount of variable payment. The findings are in line with prior results in the
field of agency theory and MAS research as they also provide evidence for the efficacy of incentive based mechanisms in delegation relationships. But this work differs
from existing MAS research as it considers a 1:many-relationship lasting over more
than one period and explicitly model stochastic influences during task completion.
This research could be extended in expanding the underlying agency model. This
can be done in several ways as the state of the art suggests. Agency theory provides
numerous variants of models to explain and to design different delegation relationships. As the research in this field is mainly based on mathematical methods, models
are often expanded in only one or two directions like shifting from one to more agents
or shifting from one to more periods. Using multiagent systems and computer simulations, even complex models will stay analyzable.
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